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Criminal omissions, causality, probability, counterfactuals:
Medical-surgical activity
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. The emergence of a new consensus on the way of
understanding omissive causation: general causation and specific or individual
causation. Professional diseases. – 2. Omission in medical-surgical activity: ex ante
probability and ex post concrete proof (particularistic proof). – 3. Ex ante probability and
medical-surgical activity. – 4. Omission in medical-surgical activity and the impossibility
of eliminating the plurality of causes. – 5. Ex post probabilities associated to
particularistic proof necessary for affirming the existence of the causal relationship in a
criminal trial. – 6. Ex post probabilities associated to particularistic proof and the support
offered to them by statistic laws with a frequency very close to 100. – 7. Ex post
probabilities and the enforcement of a covering law. – 8. Medical science, the paradigm
of microbiology and the use of statistical laws for which “given A, B almost necessarily
follows”. – 9. Counterfactuals and the “similar world”. – 10. Manipulation and emptying
of the content of the notion of logical probability or rational credibility operated by Italian
case law. – 11 The difficulties in forming the new consensus: some opinions delivered
by the Supreme Court. – 12. The new consensus and opinions of the Supreme Court
anchored to statistical laws with frequencies approaching 100 and to particularistic proof
associated to ex post probability of 99.90%. – 13. The possibility of overcoming the split
existing within the Supreme Court. – 14. The particularistic proof of what really
happened and the elimination of the problem of omissive causation.

1. The emergence of a new consensus on the way of understanding omissive
causation: the distinction between general causation and specific or individual
causation. Professional diseases. – Is a new consensus emerging on the way
of understanding omissive causation? The question assumes the existence of
an old consensus, something which, in fact, occurred, starting from the
eighties, in our case law concerning medical-surgical activity within the theory
of the “serious and appreciable probabilities of success” (probabilities
sometimes indicated at less than 50%) (1 ) and in our case law on professional
diseases following the theory of the “capability” of human conduct to do harm
and that of the increase or lack of decrease in risk (2).
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See, amongst others, III Civil Section, Cassation, 13th May 1982, no. 3013 in FIORIBOTTONE-D’ALESSANDRO, Forty Years of Jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation on
Medical Liability, Milan, 2000, p. 260 ss.; Criminal section IV Cass., 12th May 1983, no. 4320,
ivi, p. 302 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass., 10th July 1987, no. 8290, ivi, p. 515 ss.; Penal sect. IV
Cass., 27th August 1987, no. 9410, ivi, p. 527 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass, 12th May 1989, no.
7118, ivi, p. 606 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass, 13th June 1990, ivi 1991, p. 588; Penal sect. IV
Cass, 10th August 1990, no. 11389, ivi, p. 665 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass. 23rd November 1990,
no. 15565, ivi, p. 677 ss,; Penal sect. IV Cass. 17th January 1992, no. 371, ivi, p. 702 ss.,
Penal sect. IV Cass., 7th July 1993, n. 6683, ivi, p. 733 ss.; Civil sect. III Cass. 16th November
1993, n. 11287, ivi, p. 750 ss.; Penal IV sect. Cass, 11th November 1994, in Cass. Pen.1996,
p. 1442; Penal IV sect. Cass., 7th December 1999, in Giur. it. 2001, p. 572 ss; Penal sect. IV
Cass., 18th October 1990, in Cass.Pen., 1992, p. 2102; Penal sect. IV Cass., 7th March 1989,
in Riv. pen., 1990, p. 119
2
See opinions mentioned in F. STELLA, Giustizia e modernità, Milan, 3rd ed. 2003, p. 246 ss.
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The old consensus did not survive in the whole: the Full Bench of the
Supreme Court (Sezioni unite della Corte Suprema di Cassazione)
condemned the well-known criterion of the “indefinite, changeable probability
coefficients that can be manipulated by the interpreter” and the criterion of the
increase or lack of decrease in risk (3). Unfortunately, the old consensus has
not yet been replaced by a new one: the bases on which it will rest are,
however, emerging.
The distinction between general causation and specific causation is
one of the main positions taken by these bases: this is a distinction that has
burst into the juridical world in recent decades thanks to young sciences such
as epidemiology and animal biology or more noble sciences such as medicine;
it expresses very strongly the need not to confuse the forecast of what we
“generally” expect to happen in the future for the populations under
investigation or for classes or abstract types of individuals, with that which has
really happened in the individual specific case, i.e. on the ground of individual
causation. The ex ante capability of an active or omissive conduct to result in
a certain damage, ex ante probabilities associated to it, the increase or lack of
decrease of the risk that can be attributed to them, the increase or decrease of
“chances” of safety are equivalent notions that all define the sphere of general
causation: they cannot tell us ex post what caused an individual harmful event,
they do not allow us to identify the conduct that has really caused the event or
to prove on an individual basis the cause of specific or individual events (4).
There is a fairly wide-spread consensus in our jurisprudence on this
distinction relating to professional diseases (5); however, there is failure on the
part of the Supreme Court to agree explicitly about this, which explains the
reasons why consensus on the new way of understanding omissive causation
has not yet made any headway in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. To
find out what would have happened if the omitted proper conduct had
occurred, the Supreme Court often continues to use general causation (6),
3

See Cass. sect. un. pen., 10.7-11.9.2002, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 2002, p. 1133 ss.
The distinction between general causation and specific or individual causation is illustrated in
detail in F. STELLA, Giustizia e modernità, cit., p. 231 ss., 237 ss., 245 ss., 253 ss., 294 ss.,
308 ss., 327 ss., 350 ss.
5
See, amongst others, Venice Court, 22.10.2001 in Cass. pen. 2003, p. 267 ss. for which, on
the basis of epidemiological tests “there is no possibility of distinguishing in case of exposure
a subject who would not have become sick if he had not been exposed from another who
would have become sick in any case”. The Court emphasizes the importance of the quoted
distinction: “causation is general when a substance is capable of causing a damage or a
disease in a particular situation, while causation is specific when it has caused damage to the
individual person”; see also request for filing of the Prosecution Office at the Court of Brindisi,
4.5.2004, unpublished, in which, in the investigation relating to the carcinogenic effects of vinyl
chloride “general causation at the most can be considered a starting point, but certainly not an
arrival point”, i.e. the demonstration of individual causation through “the causal process that
leads to the occurrence of the carcinogenic pathology”; Milan Court, pen. sect. IX, 13.2.2003,
unpublished (the content of which is referred to by STELLA, L’allergia alle prove della
causalità individuale (Allergy towards proof of individual causation), in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.
2004, p. 412 ss.) for which there is no point in raising the problem of the causal relationship if
general causation is not proven.
6
See the opinions commented by F. STELLA, L’allergia alle prove della causalità individuale,
quoted p. 394 ss. (cases Macola, Trioni, Giacomelli, Monti, Piessevaux, Eva).
4
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without realising that only specific causation, the ex post explanation of the
individual harmful event, can inform us on the omitted prevention of the event.
What is most regrettable is that many Supreme Court Justices are not
willing to surrender to this point of view and while underlying “the difference
between general and specific causation”, pointing out that “the capability of a
substance to cause specific consequences does not mean that it did cause
them in the individual case”, do not hesitate to hold that general causation
itself can also “result in a statement of liability”, as in the case of pleural
mesothelioma for which “it now seems to be scientifically proven that it is
caused almost exclusively (in the sense that other unknown causes may be
actually ascertained and excluded) by exposure to or inhalation of asbestos
fibres” (7). But the strength of scientific evidence will get rid of every prejudice:
I have already had occasion to demonstrate that, on the basis of the most
recent scientific research, it is impossible to distinguish a mesothelioma due
to occupational exposure from a mesothelioma due to other causes (8).
When all is said and done, I believe there are sufficiently strong and
firm bases for a widening of the consensus to all Italian case law. Even the
Supreme Court will presumably be forced to reduce the weight and explicative
power of probabilities identified by epidemiological research.
I have illustrated these bases in detail in “Justice and Modernity” and in
the paper “The allergy in proof of individual causation”. An adequate synthesis
could be given here with the words of the epidemiologist VINEIS:
“The paradigm of epidemiology may be defined as the ‘black box’ method, because the aim of
epidemiological research is usually that of finding a causal relationship between any external
event (‘exposure’) and the risk of disease, without going into pathogenetic mechanisms.
The epidemiology of chronic diseases does not require a “strong” assumption about the causal
relationship: by cause we mean any exposure that precedes the onset of the disease,
compatible with a period of biological induction and that increases the probability of
contracting the disease. On the one hand, there is an obvious rejection of the deterministic
concept of cause (or at least of the necessary cause); on the other hand, historically,
epidemiology of chronic diseases has not been very interested either in defining ‘injuries’ as the
anatomical substratum of the causal relationship (for example, at the study of interim events in
the pathogenetic sequence of carcinogenesis) or in classifying problems. Actually, the
classification of a group of diseases such as cancer continues to rely on a morphological basis
– i.e. to be founded on the microscopic aspect – rather than on a aetiologic basis like
infectious diseases. This happens for the simple reason that one type of cancer has multiple
causes, and that cases due to one particular kind of exposure cannot be materially
9
distinguished, on the morphological level, from those due to another type of exposure” ( ).
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Brusco, Il vizio di motivazione nella valutazione della prova scientifica, in Dir. pen. proc.
11/2004, p. 1415. The unusual interpretation given by Justice Brusco to the Daubert verdict
should also be mentioned “the criteria identified in the Daubert case” would actually constitute
“in fact, norms or rules of experience” (p. 1414). In the analysis of the immense amount of
litterature on the Daubert case, I had never seen the most important stance taken by the
American Supreme Court on the scientific method and on the topic of the reliability of the laws
of science downgraded to a stance on banal norms of experience, by definition and by a
current commonly accepted opinion, very far from the dignity of scientific enunciations. On the
Daubert verdict see F. STELLA, Giustizia e modernità, p. 458 ss.
8
F. STELLA, L’allergia alle prove della causalità individuale, cit., p. 414 ss.
9
P. VINEIS, L’interpretazione causale degli studi epidemiologici (The causal interpretation of
epidemiologic studies, in Causalità tra diritto e medicina (Causation between Law and
Medicine), Atti del Convegno nazionale di Medicina Legale, Pavia, 1992, p. 47 ss.
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The probabilistic nature of causal inference in epidemiology (exposure
increased the probabilities of contracting the disease) is therefore beyond
dispute; and one of the most obvious implications of this nature is the
impossibility of identifying ex post workers who would not have fallen sick
without exposure and those that would have fallen sick anyway: “all
epidemiological inferences, VINEIS points out, are drawn from studies on
populations and refer exclusively to populations”; that’s the reason of “the
conflict between the individual and population level: it can be stated that in a
group of people exposed to asbestos, the risk of contracting lung cancer is
higher than in a group of non-exposed people, without this statement being
valid for individuals”(10). In the same way, the epidemiologist Berrino states:
“When we say that a certain percent of cancers is due to professional causes, the population
numbers (expected cases) do not derive from a census of cases that have been proved to be
caused by exposure, but from the difference between the cases observed in exposed people and
the number of cases that would have been expected if the incidence in the people exposed was
equal to that of the people that were not exposed”... There is no possibility of distinguishing, in
exposed cases, those who would not have fallen sick in any case... In order to state that an exposed
11
person would not have fallen sick in the absence of exposure, the judge would have to draw lots”( ).
This way of thinking is shared by epidemiologist and industrial hygienists all
over the world (12) and it is difficult therefore to understand why there is not a
new consensus extended to our case law in the whole, including that of the
Supreme Court.

2.
Omission in medical-surgical activity: the distinction between ex ante
probability and ex post concrete proof (particularistic proof). – Considerable
difficulties in forming the new consensus have arisen, however, in the area of
medical-surgical activity; and it is on this type of activity that I will now focus my
remarks.
The distinction between ex ante probability and ex post proof is under
discussion: the former are abstract probabilities, that refer to abstract types
or classes of conditions and events that do not constitute proof of what really
happened on a particular occasion, or of what would have happened in the
past had there been no omission; ex ante probabilities are useful when we are
trying to see what we expect to happen in the future, but they do not constitute
an adequate basis for an ex post explanation. Concrete proofs, proofs relating
to the individual particular case (the so-called particularistic proof) that give
us information on individual causation (13) are necessary for this explanation.
10

P. VINEIS, op.loc. cit.
BERRINO, Candido atteggiamento o denuncia di comportamenti inadeguati?, in La
medicina del lavoro, 1988, p. 167.
12
See on this point the long list of epidemiologists, industrial hygienists, forensic doctors and
legal scholars quoted in F. STELLA, Giustizia e modenità, p. 296 ss.
13
See, for all, R. W. WRIGHT, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics,
and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush in Clarifying the Concepts, in 73 Iowa L. Rev., 1988, p.
11
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The example of “a throw of the dice” is sufficient to illustrate, with the words
of a well-known American opinion, the difference between ex ante probabilities
and particularistic proof: “quantitative probability (ex ante) expresses in any
case only the most probable result, it does not constitute proof nor the
probatory elements of the proposition that must be proven; the fact that in a
throw of the dice there is a quantitative probability (ex ante) or a greater
probability that a number lower than six may appear on the side of the dice
pointing upwards, is not proof of the fact that in a given throw of the dice this is
what actually happened. Without something more, the actual result of the
throw would be totally unknown. The smallest concrete (particularistic) proof
that the six actually appeared on the upper side of the dice would, on the other
hand, have more weight than all the ex ante probabilities calculated in another
way” (14).
This is the true essence of the thought of the Full Bench of the Corte di
Cassazione, expressed with the well-known verdict of 2002 (Franzese opinion)
when it rejects, as extraneous to our judiciary, the criterion of the increase or
the lack of decrease of risk, and when it rejects the idea that omissive
causation can be considered to exist in the hypothesis in which omitted proper
conduct would have had “serious and appreciable probabilities of success”.
The Full Bench agrees on what has just been illustrated: ex ante probabilities
are not able to offer the ex post causal explanation which is necessary in the
area of omission too(15).
For the Full Bench of the Supreme Court also, the ex post causal
explanation needs particularistic proof.
And in fact, after stating the
cornerstone of its own thought, the need to resort to a covering law “an
antecedent can be considered a necessary condition only if it falls within the
list of those which, on the basis of a regular succession, comply with a
generalized rule of experience or with a law possessing scientific validity, a
‘covering law’, and leads to events ‘of the same type’ as the one that actually
occurred”), the Full Bench indicates its second cornerstone in particularistic
proof: “it remains the unavoidable duty of judicial knowledge to establish if the
postulated nomological connection is actually pertinent”. After ascertaining
this, research into the “available evidence” relating to specific elements of the
actual case that excludes any reasonable doubt “on the real conditioning
efficacy of individual omissive conduct within the causation web is equally
unavoidable”. In other words, “it is not allowed to deduce automatically from
the probability coefficient expressed by statistical law..... confirmation or lack of
confirmation of the accusatory hypothesis concerning the existence of the
causal relationship”; and it is not allowed because it is “the circumstances of
1001, 1077, translated in F. STELLA, I saperi del giudice. La Causalità e il ragionevole
dubbio, Milano, 2004, p. 139 ss.
14
Day vs Boston & Me R.R., (1902) Me 207, 52 A 771 quoted in R. WRIGHT, op:cit., p. 1052.
15
Cass.Sez.Un.Pen 10.7.2002, in Riv. It. Dir. Proc. Pen., 2002, p. 1133 ss. On the matter M.
Donini recently affirmed that “after twenty years of convictions, a certain convergence would
seem to have been reached (the conditional form is unavoidable) on the unlawfulness of the
substitution (hermeneutically) of omissive causation required by law with imputation
parameters founded on the mere increase in risk”.DONINI, Il volto attuale dell’illecito penale.
La democrazia penale tra differenziazione e sussidiarietà, Milan, 2004, 2004 p. 122 s.
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the fact and the available evidence” which – “on the result of the probatory
reasoning that has also excluded the interference of alternative factors” – must
indicate if we can reach the conclusion that the omissive conduct is
procedurally certain ...and was a necessary condition for the harmful event”.

3. Ex ante probability and medical-surgical activity. – A brief review of some
italian opinions on medical-surgical activity will now confirm that ex ante
probabilities cannot give us any information about what would happen if the
omitted conduct had been realised.
In a recent important trial, some executives of a chemical plant had
been accused by the Public Prosecutor of having made it impossible to make
an early diagnosis of some liver cancers contracted by workmen exposed to a
certain chemical substance, thus preventing the transplant and resection of the
liver and therefore causing their premature death.
From the cross-examination of experts, the crucial nature of the
distinction between ex ante and ex post probability emerged; according to the
experts, the real great limitation of transplantology, in treating liver, is that the
factors on the basis of which the transplant or resection is decided are
predictive factors, in the sense that they predict if the patient will live or die
following the transplant or resection, and therefore they are limited to indicating
ex ante probabilities; after resection, and therefore a posteriori, the surgeon
may notice that the tumour was too aggressive, and that therefore the
operation should not have taken place because, by performing it, the patient’s
life had been shortened rather than lengthened.
The truth is that early diagnosis of tumoral diseases – this is still the
opinion of the experts – gives an artificial increase in survival: ex ante
probabilities can indicate survival of one year after resection; ex post, the
surgeon notices that, even without resection, the patient would have survived
for a year. Survival after the resection of liver cancers caused by cirrhosis can
even reach 20 or 30% of early identified cases, but that means that in 70, 80%
of cases, the operation reveals itself to be inefficacious ex post (16).
Therefore the serious error to be found in the prosecution’s hypothesis
is clear: it relied on ex ante probabilities, on predictive factors that are unable
to tell us anything about what would have happened if early diagnosis had
been carried out.
The situation does not change if, from transplants and resections of the
liver we go on to the resection of lung tumours. Here also, we come up
against ex ante probabilities that predict what would have happened in the
case of immediate diagnosis and surgery.
Again, this has nothing to do with what actually happened or what would
have really happened: from an ex post investigation it would appear that the
patient who underwent immediate lung resection did not survive the operation,
or died immediately after it because of complications such as myocardial

16

Court of Venice, 22.10.2002 hearing 18.5.99, cross examination of Prof. Colombo that can
be consulted on the web site www.petrolchimico.it.
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infarction, lung failure, pneumonia, pulmonary embolism, renal failure and so
forth.
The available data in the sector confirm our statement. To begin with, in
one study conducted in the United States in 2004 (17), out of 55 patients
diagnosed with tumours, also on the basis of computerised tomography (CAT),
in 10 patients the diagnosis was found to be wrong ex post: instead of cancer,
a benign disease was found. What is to be said about ex ante probability
here?
There are many other examples I can quote. As to the mortality rate
during the first 30 days after the operation, in a Spanish 1997 study, out of 605
patients who underwent thoractomy due to bronchogenic carcinoma, 40
patients died after surgery for causes due, above all, to respiratory failure (18);
in a Swiss study carried out in 1999, out of 621 patients who underwent lung
resection due to lung cancer, 19 died, within 30 days from surgery, due to
cardio-vascular complications, haemorrhages, sepsis and acute damage to the
lungs (19); according to a subsequent Swiss study in 2002, out of 193 patients
who underwent pneumonectomy, the mortality frequency at 30 days after
surgery was equal to 9.3% and was mainly co-related to haemorrhages,
pneumonia, bronchopulmonary and hemipulmonary fistulae, arhythmia and
pulmonary embolisms (20); according to a Norwegian study of 2004, out of
2,528 patients who underwent pulmonary resection, 188 died within 60 days
due to respiratory failure, pneumonia, haemorrhages, broncho-pleural fistulae,
myocardium infarction or other complications (21).
According to an Italian study conducted by the National Research
Council and by the Ministry of Education in 2003, post-operative mortality is 29%, correlated to pneumonia, ARDS (Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome),
atelectasis, respiratory failure, pulmonary embolism, pulmonary oedema,
myocardium infarction, arhythmia, heart failure, haemorrhagic gastritis,
parenchymal fistulae, bronchial fistulae, infection of the surgical wound,
haemothorax (22).
The question is once more: what must we say about ex ante
probabilities? In plain words, to exclude that if the proper omitted conduct
(early diagnosis and immediate surgery) had been observed the patient
would not have died following resection, due to myocardium infarction,
pneumonia, pulmonary oedema, respiratory failure, haemorrhage, kidney
failure or other complications, is simply impossible. It is impossible to give
17

CRESTARELLO et al., Thoracic Surgical Operations in Patients Enrolled in a Computer
Tomographic Screening Trial, in The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery, 2004, p.
254 ss.
18
DUQUE et al., Early Complications in Surgical Treatment of Lung Cancer: A Prospective
Multicenter Study, in The Annals of Thoracic Surgery, 1997, p. 944-950.
19
LICKER et al., Perioperative Mortality and Major Cardiopulmonary Complications after Lung
Surgery for Non-small Cell Carcinoma, in European Journal of Cardio-Thoracic Surgery, 1999,
p. 314-319.
20
LICKER et al., Risk Factors for Early Mortality and Major Complications Following
Pneumonectomy for Non-small Cell Carcinoma of the Lung, in Chest, 2002, p. 1890-1897.
21
ROSTAND, NEALSUND, JACOBSTEIN et al., Causes of Postoperative Mortality after Lung
Cancer Surgery, in Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen, 2004, p. 982 ss.
22
CNR-MIUR oncological project, I tumori del polmone, 24.11.2003, p. 2-39.
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particularistic proof and to identify the ex post probabilities associated to it, as
we should do in order to formulate a causal statement that explains what
would actually have happened.
The impossibility is even more obvious if we consider the deaths of
patients where a timely diagnosis was made of a small nodule. In a study
carried out in 2002 and published on the authoritative journal New England
Journal of Medicine (23) we read the following: “however, the size of the nodule
at diagnosis does not necessarily correlate with the clinical outcome. It cannot
be assumed that the biologic conduct of lung cancer, the result of a variety of
genetic changes, parallels anatomical size. In fact, there are currently no
data to confirm that a primary 5-mm lung tumour has a significantly better
prognosis than a 10-mm tumour or even a 30-mm tumour. In a recent study
on 510 patients with T1M0M0 disease (tumours less than 3 cm in diameter),
there was no statistical correlation between small size at diagnosis and
survival. Patients with 3-cm masses had the same outcomes as those
with nodules less than 1 cm. in diameter. The assumptions that tumors size
correlates with biologic conduct and that small lesions are equivalent to earlystage disease have not been confirmed for lung cancer. In some studies,
about 60% of patients with clinical (detected through x-rays) stage 1 disease
(tumours less than 3 cm in diameter) died from lung cancer within 5 years,
despite appropriate therapy. This suggests that a high percentage of patients
have disseminated, occult disease at the time of presentation”.
And here is the situation for gastro-intestinal tumours: according to an
American study of 2000, out of 4,711 patients who underwent colectomy as a
result of cancer of the colon, death within 30 days occurred in 335 cases
(5.7%): mortality frequency was significantly higher (equal to 50%) in patients
with complications compared with those without, i.e. in cases of post-surgical
coma, cardiac arrest, kidney failure, lung embolism or infection of the urinary
tract (24); in a Hungarian study of 2002, out of 161 patients who had undergone
a gastrectomy operation, 61 had suffered complications (anastomotic leak,
septic complications, intraluminal haemorrhage, post-surgical pancreatitis,
intra-abdominal haemorrhage, pancreatic fistulae, obstructions of the small
intestine, complications of the cardio-respiratory system) and 8 patients died
during the post-surgical period (25); in a Canadian study of 2003, out of 19,511
people that had undergone oesophagectomy or resection of the colon or
rectum, the mortality rate in 30 days following the operations varied from 3.8%
for resection of the colon or rectum to 13.4% for oesophagectomy (26); in an
American study of 2004, out of 22,633 patients who underwent surgical
resection, for colorectal cancer, mortality at 30 days as a result of the

23

PATZ et al., Screening for Lung Cancer, in NEJM, vol. 343, n.22.
LONGO et al., Risk Factors for Morbidity and Mortality after Colectomy for Colon Caner, in
Dis. Colon Rectum 2000, p. 83-89.
25
SZUCS et al., Effect of Extending the Resection on Postoperative Complications of Total
Gastrectomies: Experience with 161 Operations, in Magy Seb, 2002 p. 362-68.
26
URBACH et al., Differences in Operative Mortality between High-and-low-volume Hospitals
in Ontario for 5 Major Surgical Procedures: Estimating the Number of Lives Potentially Saved
Through Regionalization, in CMAJ, 2003, p. 1049-14.
24
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operation was equal to 2.8% in patients under 65 years of age with cancer of
the colon, while it was 5.6% in patients of over 65 years of age (27).
Here again, what about ex ante probabilities? How would the judge
possibly exclude that the patient would have died as well from post-surgical
coma, kidney failure, pulmonary embolism, cardiac arrest, haemorrhage, postsurgical pancreatitis or other complications?
And what about myocardium infarction?
According to an American study of the early Nineties, out of 200
patients hospitalised with diagnosis of acute infarction of the lower
myocardium, at the time of admission to hospital 22 patients (11%) had had a
cardiogenic shock. 38 patients died (19%) and 94 patients had serious
complications during hospitalisation, including cardiogenic shock, ventricular
fibrillation, tachycardia, myocardium rupture, third degree atrioventricular
blockage, chronic bradycardia and re-infarction: most of these complications
occurred in the 24 hours immediately following hospitalisation. In this period of
time, 13 patients died due to cardiac causes (7%) and 58 patients had more
serious complications (28); according to another American study carried out in
1999, out of 9,076 hospitalised patients an overall incidence of 7.1% of
cardiogenic shock cases was registered for the whole study period considered:
the analysis also showed that patients with acute infarction in which
cardiogenic shock had occurred had a significantly higher mortality incidence
during hospitalisation than those in whom cardiogenic shock had not occurred
(71.1% compared with 12.0%). Mortality during the hospitalisation of patients
with cardiogenic shock remained constant over the years, equal to
approximately 77% (29); according to a multi-centric American study of 2002,
out of 5,065 patients who underwent coronary bypass surgery, 165 patients
died during hospitalisation (3.2%) and 812 (16%) had cardiac, cerebral, renal
or gastro-intestinal complications. 100% of these deaths were associated to
one or more adverse ischemic events. 43 patients died in the 48 hours
immediately after the operation (and 291 had had complications that were not
fatal in this period). In 121 cases, death occurred in the 48 hours following
revascularisation (30); according to an Italian study of 2004, from 10 to 15% of
hospitalised patients died because of acute cardiogenic shock (31).
At this point we know the question we should ask: since we know that
the ex ante probabilities of survival are certainly higher in the event of
immediate hospitalisation, compared with cases of non-hospitalisation, how
can we known ex post if the patient with myocardial infarction who was not
27

RABENECK et al., Outcomes in Elderly Patients Following Surgery for Colorectal Cancer in
the Veterans Affaire Health Care System, in Aliment Pharmacol. Ther,. 2004, p. 1115-24.
28
ZEHENDER et al., Right Ventricular Infarction as an Independent Predictor of Prognosis
after Acute Inferior Myocardial Infarction, in The New England Journal of Medicine, 1993, p.
981-88.
29
GOLDBERG et al., Temporal Trends in Cardiogenic Shock Complicating Acute Myocardial
Infarction, in The New England Journal of Medicine, 1999, p. 1162-68.
30
MANGANO et al., Aspirin and Mortality from Coronary Bypass Surgery, in The New England
Journal of Medicine, 2002, p. 1309-1317.
31
VITALI et al., Surgical Treatment of Acute Myocardial Infarction, in Italian Heart J., 2004
(Supp. 6), p. 92-96.
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hospitalised immediately, would have died from cardiogenic shock or not, in
the case of immediate hospitalisation? There is no way to know this, which
means that the judge is not able to exhibit particularistic proof with associated
ex post probabilities that the proper omitted conduct would have prevented the
harmful event.
The problems linked to ex ante diagnosis-prognosis and to the ex post
explanation of individual events in clinical medicine are also quite significant.
Clinical diagnosis tout court aims at knowing as much as possible about
the patient’s current situation and the therapy to be implemented in the
disease is inferred from this knowledge: it “can never be declared true beyond
any shadow of a doubt” (32); the prognosis consists in the “prediction that the
doctor, on the basis of the factual elements collected and/or of the suspected
diagnosis, formulates on the future course of the morbid phenomena of his
patient” (33). Since the diagnostic judgement of the doctor can be either of the
nosographic type (founded on the use of categories) or of the physiopathologic
type (characterised by explicative reasoning of a causal nomologic type), the
prognosis can also have this dual nature (34).
If the diagnosis is of the nosographic type “ the prognosis will be
formulated by attributing to the patient a probability of going towards a specific
result of the disease equal to the probability assigned to this result in the
symptomatologic picture of the disease”. For example:
“If we imagine a patient in whom, on the basis of recurring mouth and genital ulcers, the
diagnosis of Behcet’s Syndrome has been put forward, the doctor knows that in 10-25% of
patients affected by this disease, neurological damage exists and that (at least prior to 1970) in
subjects with neurological complications, mortality is 40%; he also knows that 50% of these
patients suffer from arthropathies or actual arthritis. On the basis of the probablities deduced
from literature, the doctor will state that this patient has a 0.10-0.25 probability of suffering a
neuropathy and that, if neurological changes are present, he will have a 0.04-0.10 probability of
dieing. Finally, he will be able to predict that his patient will have an approximately 0.50
probability of suffering from problems in the joints. These prognostic judgements have an
35
obvious inductive basis and constitute cases of ‘ individual predictive inference’”( )

Physiopathological prognosis is based on the prediction that the initial
conditions of the explanandum will occur with regularities indicated by
physiological laws: “it is clear that since the prognosis is based on an event
that has still to occur, it is less certain than the diagnosis; in fact, in prognostic
judgement, a further element is added to the elements of uncertainty present in
the diagnostic judgement, linked to the possibility that certain circumstances
that are decisive for the course of the disease, may actually occur or not occur
(often the backing laws that the doctor uses in formulating a prognosis are not
referred to explicitly, so that we could say that .... elliptical prognoses are
made)” (36).
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The ex post investigation of the doctor can, on the other hand, give rise
to the explanation. To explain a clinical case “means completely reconstructing
the pathogenetic sequence that has occurred in a patient”.
Moreover, “very few diseases have been really explained to date. On the contrary, we can state
that in many fields of medicine, as research progresses, an increasingly rich, articulate and
complex causal process is developing, so that a complete explanation of morbid phenomena
seems to become an increasingly distant objective. On one hand, the concept of gene has
shown itself to be much more articulate than was thought up to the last decades of the
twentieth-century. On the other hand, several pathogenetic sequences that were thought to
constitute apparently unitary pathologies have been found. Diabetes mellitus of second type,
obesity and ischemic cardiopathy all represent examples of morbid processes considered
unitary, that today are determined by numerous pathogenetic sequences that are very different
from each other, so that it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the idea of a single causal
process similar to the one introduced by the microbiological paradigm” (37).

With things in this way, it is clear that (1) ex ante probabilities
associated to diagnosis and prognosis are not able to give any information on
what really happened, and that (2) very often this information cannot be given
even from the explanation itself because “very few diseases have been truly
explained to date”.
In this situation, it is even pointless to ask if it is possible to know what
would have happened if the omitted proper conduct had taken place, i.e. if a
correct diagnosis and prognosis had been made.

4.
Omission in medical-surgical activity and the impossibility of eliminating
the plurality of causes. – An initial conclusion is emerging that may appear a
surprising novelty for those who adopted the traditional concept of omissive
causation: very often the intervention of “other causes” cannot be excluded
with certainty, as the Full Bench of the Supreme Court would like, when we
wonder if the omitted proper conduct would have prevented the occurrence of
the harmful event.
Let us suppose to have a patient who died from a lung tumour that was
not resected immediately. To assert the causal importance of the omitted
conduct (immediate surgery) the judge would have to have proof that the
patient would not have died if the diagnosis and surgical operation had not
been carried out too late. This proof, however, cannot be reached: the judge
will never be able to demonstrate that, if immediate intervention had taken
place, the patient would not have died from pneumonia, pulmonary embolism,
respiratory failure, haemorrhage, myocardium infarction, arhythmia, heart
failure, kidney failure, infection of the surgical wound or broncho-pleural
fistulae.
Similarly, the judge will never be able to demonstrate that the patient
would not have died in any case even if immediate resection of the liver or the
gastro-intestinal tumour had occurred (up to exclude death from post-surgical
coma, kidney failure, pulmonary embolism, cardiac arrest, haemorrhage, postsurgical pancreatitis and other complications) or if the patient had received
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appropriate therapy for myocardium infarction following immediate
hospitalisation.
The reasons for the impossibility of proof must be sought in a peculiarity
of omissive causation: the judge must not search for information about what
really happened, but information about what would have happened if the
omitted conduct had been carried out. What is before the eyes of the judge,
however, is an unmistakable and exclusively hypothetical counterfactual world
and the information that can be deduced from the real world is wholly
inadequate to make what would have happened clear.
This is a very important remark for the theory of omissive causation; it
demonstrates that, when we talk about omitted proper conduct, it is often
totally impossible to pose the problem of the plurality of causes: in the
hypothetical world which the judge must deal with, information on what would
have happened if precautionary rules had been observed cannot be traced.

5. Ex post probabilities associated to particularistic proof necessary for
affirming the existence of the causal relationship in a criminal trial. – Ex post
probabilities however are decisive in order to verify what actually happened or
what might have happened.
As Richard Wright puts it: “In the dice throwing hypothetical, there are
two possible generalization statements: ‘throwing a dice causes six spots to
fall uppermost one-sixth of the time’ and ‘throwing a dice causes fewer than six
spots to fall uppermost five-sixths of the time’”. The ex ante causal probabilities
associated to these two generalizations are respectively 17% and 83%, and
provide a strong basis for predicting what will happen or for betting that the
second generalization is more likely to occur than the first.
Nevertheless, they provide no information at all on which of the two
causal generalizations was actually instantiated on this particular occasion.
On the other hand, if there is any particularistic evidence that a six actually fell
uppermost, that would be evidence that the abstract result in the first causal
generalization was instantiated and that the abstract result in the second
causal generalization was not instantiated. There then would be a greater ex
post causal probability that the causal law underlying the first causal
generalization, rather than the second, was fully instantiated, despite the much
greater ex ante causal probabilities for the second causal generalization.(38).
Particularistic evidence is therefore necessary for the causal
explanation, i.e. to establish what really happened, because only this type of
evidence can confirm or deny the instantiation of the abstract elements of an
ex ante generalization.
Another example – I have discussed in other papers (39) – can be useful
in confirming the accuracy of this conclusion. X fired 99 bullets against V, Y
fired only one, one single bullet strikes V and kills him; further to ballistic tests
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carried out on the weapons of both X and Y, thanks to the marks left on it, the
single bullet can be identified as coming from gun Y and not from gun X.
No generalization exists that can explain the murder of V in terms of the
ratio of bullets fired by X or Y or vice versa; we can only argue a causal
generalization which establishes that firing “a shot at someone” means killing
him. We could also argue a generalization of the type “the more bullets one
fires at someone, the more likely you are to kill him”. Those who support such
a generalization might even argue that a person – X - who fires 99 bullets is
almost certain to kill the intended victim, while a different person – Y - who
fires only one shot is much less likely to do so.
So, as Wright points out, this generalization seems spurious. A causal
generalization must be capable of being instantiated. What particularistic
evidence would instantiate the abstract element described as “the more bullets
one fires”?(40).
The truth is that
“applying standard mathematical probability rules, the ex ante causal probability that all ninetynine of X’s bullets would miss V was at least .37 (.99 to the 99th power). So the ex ante causal
probability that at least one of X’s ninety-nine bullets would hit V was at most only 63%. There
is insufficient data to estimate the effectiveness of Y’s shooting, which might have been highly
effective (100%)... In our shooting hypothetical, even if Y is presumed to be as poor a
marksman as X, so that the ex ante causal probability that Y would kill V was at most one
percent while the ex ante causal probability that X would kill V was at most 63%, the great
disparity in ex ante causal probabilities tells us nothing about which possibility actually occurred
on this particular occasion. To determine what actually occurred, we must determine whether
the causal law underlying the causal generalization involving X or the causal law underlying the
causal generalization involving Y was fully instantiated on this particular occasion. Only
particularistic evidence – and ex post causal probabilities based solely on such evidence, are
41
probative on the issue of instantiation”.( )

.
Thus, the probabilities deriving from ballistic tests are ex post causal
probabilities, based on particularistic evidence with a high probatory value:
each gun has unique irregularities on the surface of the barrel and on the
breech that make distinctive marks on each bullet that is fired. In our
hypothetical, the marks on the particular bullet that killed V were compared
with those on the bullets that were fired by X and Y. The marks on the bullets
constitute particularistic evidence that the bullet that killed V was fired by gun Y
and not gun X.
The probability of error is assessed almost entirely on the basis of the
skill of the person who carried out the comparison between the various bullets.
And note that even if we accept the assumption of only 80% accuracy,
the ballistics tests on both guns in our hypothetical result in a 94% ex post
causal probability that the bullet that killed V came from Y’s weapon, compared
with a minimal 6% causal probability that it came from X’s.
Wright, who with regard to this point quotes the corresponding opinion
of scholars of the importance of GLANVILLE WILLIAMS and JONATHAN
COHEN, points out that 94% ex post causal probability should be sufficient to
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justify a finding, based on the preponderance of the evidence as required in
a civil suit, that Y and not X caused the death of V (42).
Wright’s reference to the rule of the civil court is important. It allows us
to point out the particularly high value that ex post probability associated to
particularistic evidence must have, in a criminal suit.
In the legal process, scholars of applied mathematics who try to explain
the meaning of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” in quantitative terms
“generally require an ex post probability higher than a threshold very close to
1” (43).
The recent study by FROSINI has showed that
“in so far as different people can give different interpretations of the terms ‘very high
probabilities’, ‘practical certainty’, ‘very low probability’ and such like, it would seem, in any case,
that we must exclude the possibility of talking about ‘practical certainty’ if the probability in
question is lower than 0.99; on the contrary, it would seem more reasonable to move this
probability at least to 0.999... This means, following the opinion of NEYMAN-PEARSON, that
probability of error of the first kind (to convict an individual when he is innocent) should be
44
adequately low, for example lower than 0.001 (i.e. 1 in a thousand)” ( ).

When the stake is very high (the guilt or innocence of the accused), the
judgement standard – observed FROSINI – should be based on these very ex
post probabilities. If the importance of the stake is very high, even in the civil
trial practical certainty will be required, i.e. an ex post probability of over 99%;
thus in order to attribute a DNA profile to a specific person, for the purposes of
the legal declaration of natural paternity, according to the Italian Supreme
Court, “a degree of probability which, with the yardstick of current scientific
knowledge, normally exceeds 99% is necessary” (45). For the Court of Appeal
of Perugia, if “we reach a probability that approaches mathematical certainty
and, moreover, if such results appear to be corroborated by the so-called
historical proof (concerning the existence of a stable and long-lasting
sentimental relationship between the mother of the minor and the alleged
father, the concern of the latter during the pregnancy and birth as well as
further relevant important circumstances), then the application for the
recognition of natural paternity can certainly be accepted (46). According to a
verdict of the Court of Appeal of L’Aquila in 2002, “ if the DNA test of the
deceased father attributes 99.96% probability of a positive result and a series
of unequivocal positive elements are added to this (in this case, the
relationship between the alleged father and the mother; knowledge on the part
of the friends and relatives of the deceased of the fact that the latter
succeeded in having a daughter from the plaintiff through artificial
insemination, etc...), the natural paternity of the deceased father can be
legally declared” (47).
42
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It is worth adding that the case law of other countries reaches similar
findings: for the attribution of paternity, the maximum value of ex post
probability is 99.73% in Germany, 99.99% in the Netherlands and 99.9% in
common law countries, in which the attribution of the DNA profile to a specific
person, in a criminal trial, is possible when the error does not exceed 1 out of
10,000 (ex post probability of 99.9%) (48).
The reference to ex post probabilities required in order to attribute a
DNA profile to a given person is even more pertinent when we are dealing with
the investigation on causation: in fact there is no reason in the world that can
explain why the ex post probabilities of the individual causal propositions
should be lower, in a criminal trial, than the ex post probabilities required for
the attribution of paternity.

6.
Ex post probabilities associated to particularistic evidence and the
support given to them by statistical laws with a frequency very close to 100. –
We must now investigate the hypotheses in which particularistic evidence
linked to an ex post causal explanation can be associated to an ex post
probability “very close to 1”, i.e. of 0.999 with an error probability of 1 out of
1,000, if the judge uses statistical laws. Here also we must quote the opinion
of scholars of statistics applied to the criminal trial. FROSINI states that an
objective ex post probability, in order to be close to 1, must derive from a
statistical law “with a percentage coefficient very close to 100”. Only in this
way, according to the scholar, can we reach practical certainty, i.e. an ex post
probability approaching 100%. And FROSINI adopts the example of the
opinions of the Supreme Court that demands, for the causal explanation, the
statistical law with frequency close to 100 (Baltrocchi, Di Cintio, Musto
opinions) (49).
On the same wave-length, among the jurists, WRIGHT, states that “an
ex ante causal probability can represent evidence of what really happened
only if the ex ante causal probability is so high that it practically excludes an
alternative causal generalization, so that the potentially applicable causal
generalization is practically equivalent to a (universal) causal law” (50).
I, myself, in 1975 in “Scientific laws and causal explanation in criminal
law” agreed with HEMPEL’s theory which requires a frequency approaching
100 precisely (51).
On the philosophical level, there are an infinity of quotations. For
CARNAP a 5% frequency may offer an unsatisfactory and extremely weak ex
post explanation, while a 97% frequency offers an adequate explanation (52);
for HEMPEL, an adequate ex post explanation of individual events can be had
if the inductive support, represented by the nomologic premises (statistical
laws), is very strong, i.e. if the frequency stated by statistical law is very close
48
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to the 100% of cases: “if probability q is close to 1, a law of this type can be
invoked to explain the occurrence of C in a particular given case in which
conditions f occurred”. In other words, the frequencies indicated by statistical
law can constitute the basis for the causal explanation with an ex post
probability associated to the particularistic evidence only if the statistical law
gives an overwhelming ex ante probability and it is practically certain that the
event occurred due to the instantiation of the statistical law (53); for POPPER,
the ex post causal explanation for an individual event is only possible if the
explanans contains “universal laws” together with some singular statements,
called initial conditions (54); for NAGEL, the ex post explanation is causal if the
law contained in the explanans “is causal because the relationship formulated
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by it is invariable or uniform” (55); for PASQUINELLI, only “laws of causal
succession that state the existence of an invariable and uniform relationship,
necessary in a physical sense between the facts” can be assumed in support
of the ex post causal explanation (56); for AGAZZI, the idea of causation is
closely linked to that of necessity and therefore “for the very reason that it
admits exceptions, a statistical law already indicates the absence of necessity
and the least that can be demanded is that it should be very close to 1” (57) ;
for MACKIE, “true universal propositions exist from which the occurrence of E
derives, given certain additional singular premises, and the fact that the
occurrence of C was real. That the occurrence of C is a necessary condition
for the occurrence of E therefore means that true universal propositions exist
from which the occurrence of C derives, given certain additional, singular
premises” (58).
What should in any case guide the choice of the statistical laws to be
inserted in the explanans?
A question of this type can only be resolved if we look at the context in
which the practical action takes place: for the practical action – says
HEMPEL – and for the decisions to be adopted if the probabilistic
hypotheticals are to be accepted or rejected, on the basis of statistics
concerning the observed frequencies, there is the need for appropriate
criteria.
“The stringency of the chosen standards will normally vary with the context (...). Broadly
speaking it will depend on the importance which is attached, in the given context, to avoiding
two kinds of errors that might be made: rejecting the hypothesis under test, although if it is true;
and accepting it although it is false. The importance of this point is particularly clear when the
acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis is to serve as a basis for the practical action. Thus, if
the hypothesis concerns the probable effectiveness and safety of a new vaccine, then the
decision about its acceptance will have to take into account not only how well the statistical tests
results accord with the probabilities specified by the hypothesis, but also how serious would be
the consequences of accepting the hypothesis and acting on it (i.e.by inoculating children with
59
the vaccine) when in fact it is false” ( ).

This step by Hempel is really crucial; the decisions to be adopted, on
the basis of probabilities depend on the context: if the hypothesis of the
existence of the causal relashionship is based on “medium or low”
probabilities, and results to be false, the consequences are devastating
(conviction of the innocent), in some way similar to those of inoculation of the
vaccine. This is why the ex ante probability must be close to 100; only such a
probability guarantees that the probability of an error of the first kind (to convict
an individual when he is innocent) is adequately low, i.e. lower than 0.001 and
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that i.e. the ex post probabilities linked to the particularistic evidence allow at
the most an error of 1 out of 1000 (60).

7. Ex post probability and the instantiation of the covering law. Summing up,
we can state that the singular causal proposition, linked to particularistic
evidence, must be matched, in the criminal trial, by an ex post probability of
99.9% (FROSINI observes however that, in calculating these ex post
probabilities, some errors may be concealed due to theoretical bias that are
not included in the coefficient of confidence and that therefore “a real defence,
with respect to errors of the first kind, is never higher than 99%” and “a
calculated probability of 99% should be assessed cautionally at around 95%)
(61).
To arrive at an explanation that has such a high degree of ex post
probability, particularistic evidence must constitute the instantiation of a causal
law, i.e. of a universal law, or of a statistical law with a frequency very close to
100. WRIGHT dedicates many pages to demonstrating that the particularistic
evidence of the causal relationship consists “in the complete and actual
instantiation, in a particular case, of a causal generalization”:
“In order to prove that a specific condition was the cause of a particular occurrence, we must
obviously establish that both the condition and the event actually occurred and that some
credible causal generalization links conditions of that type to events of that type. The evidence
will be corroborated by the circumstance that the other known conditions, that are part of the
causal generalization, also occurred. On the other hand, there will be no evidence of causation
if we establish that any one of the conditions requested did not occur. Finally, we must
distinguish between all applicable causal generalizations alternatively, disputing them or raising
substantial doubts on the instantiation of one or more of the conditions required by the
62
alternative generalization” ( ).

8.
Medical science, the paradigm of microbiology and the use of statistical
laws for which “given A, B almost necessarily follows ”. – These are the
premises that should constitute the basis of the new consensus on liability for
the omitted prevention of the event in medical-surgical activity: the
counterfactual, aimed at establishing what would have occurred if the omitted
conduct had been carried out, must demonstrate that the conduct would have
made it possible to offer particularistic evidence linked to the instantiation of a
universal law or of a statistical law with a frequency very close to 100. It is on
the very ground of medical-surgical activity, in fact, that the considerations
made up to now, on the instantiation of a universal or statistical causal law
with a frequency very close to 100, find a highly convincing confirmation.
The appeal for the need to make use, in the ex post reconstruction of
what would have occurred if the omitted conduct had taken place, of the “most
up-to-date medical-legal criteriology” comes from the United States. The
adjective “most up-to-date” assumes a “less up-to-date” criteriology, i.e. that
60
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has not been updated: it is the old criteriology based on the idea that forensic
doctors must ascertain not the necessary condition, but the “capability” of a
substance or a conduct to produce a certain damage, i.e. in short ex ante
probabilities.
In Italy, this old criteriology, as I showed in “Justice and Modernity”, has
been definitely discredited and has been eliminated both by the intervention of
the Full Bench of the Supreme Court and by recent contributions of the current
leaders of the forensic medicine movement, BARNI and FIORI: the forensic
doctor duty is to ascert the necessary condition (63). The new criteriology – the
more up-to-date one – however, has not yet been processed by forensic
medicine scholars; and it is for this reason that the basic indications must be
sought in the works of medical epistemology scholars, and first of all in the
very recent work of FEDERSPIL “Clinical Logic”.
“If we reflect on current medical knowledge, it is easy to establish that in pathology the ideal of
cause as a necessary condition is still today fundamental (64); and it became fundamental
when microbiology changed the paradigm of pathology. While for pre-Pasteurian medicine, an
almost infinite series of different factors should be the cause of a disease, with the birth of
microbiology and with the coding of Koch postulates – i.e. 1) it must be possible to
demonstrate the micro-organism in every case of that specific disease; 2) the micro-organism
must be cultivated in a pure culture; 3) inoculation of the micro-organism into the culture must
reproduce the diseases in susceptible animals; 4) the micro-organism must be re-obtained from
the inoculated animals – we have gone on to a different theoretical definition; causation became
necessary since the finding of a specific micro-organism constituted the conditio sine qua non
for the development of an infectious disease” (65).

The example of the paradigm of microbiology is fitting: it allows the
doctor and pathologist to go beyond the formulation of hypotheses or
diagnostic conjectures, and to provide true aetiological diagnoses, since they
are founded on controlled hypotheses. FEDERSPIL says again: “imagine a
subject who has been in contact with a cholera patient and who has worrying
symptoms... The symptoms will be attributed to the cholera vibrio. This
situation can actually be checked, by identifying the vibrio in the faeces and
possibly by injecting it into an animal” (66).
The Italian epidemiologist COMBA offers similar indications about the
paradigm of microbiology:
“Initially, epidemiologists working on transmittable pathologies relied on the paradigm of
microbiology that gave them a scheme of interpretation. In order to say that a micro-organism
caused a disease, it was necessary to check that the organism had been re-found in all cases of
the disease, it had to be isolated in the patients, cultivated on a Petri dish, then reinoculated in a
laboratory animal, to reproduce the disease. This was the precise scheme of causation, that
had given excellent results from the end of the last century until after the war” (67).
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And if the paradigm of microbiology cannot be used?
When asked this question the only thing we can do is to question
medicine again, to understand if it has covering laws which, disregarding
intermediate causal links, connect the “initial” and the “final” event even if they
are not continuous in time and not contiguous in space.
Once again it is FEDERSPIL who gives us the answer: within the
sphere of medical knowledge, these laws, used in cases of “simple, linear
causation” make it possible to identify the cause of a morbid phenomenon in
“a very powerful external event, that produces constantly or almost
constantly specific consequences in the organism: a serious gun-shot wound,
the action of yersinia pestis, the action of amanita phalloides, etc”. In certain
cases, then in medicine, a covering law indicates that a certain cause always
produces a specific effect, and that that effect is caused by that cause and
only by that cause (thus the problem of the plurality of causes disappears):
“this causal mode can be simplified by what happens after a burn: a very
intense source of heat always produces an immediate necrosis of the tissues
and that type of necrosis, that appears in a short time, is practically only
produced by burns”: In short in order to identify the cause, in medicine
universal laws can be used (“given A, B necessarily follows”) together with
almost universal statistical laws (“given A, B almost necessarily follows”).
These kind of laws, introduced into the explanans together with the initial
conditions, make it possible to identify the necessary condition when
instantiation is not demonstrated in the individual case.
FEDERSPIL is very clear on this point:
“Causal laws do not only state the existence of an invariable connection of events, but they are
laws of succession, in the sense that they link events that take place at different times.
Examples of these laws can be considered assertions of this type: ‘the application of a stress to
an organism always releases adrenocortical hormones’, or ‘the Toh secretion of hypophysis
stimulates the release of hormones by the thyroid’. These laws are in fact called universal laws
and for a long time have represented the ideal model of scientific laws. However, not all
scientific laws have this universal form. In fact, other laws exist that are called probabilistic or
statistical, which state that in X% of cases A is followed by B: for example, the assertion
‘rheumatic cardiopathy is followed in X% of cases by a mitral stenosis’” (68).

The necessary condition for a pathological event in medicine can be
identified, therefore, by proving that a statistical law was instantiated in the
individual case which, as we have seen, according to FEDERSPIL (and other
scholars of medical epistemology), must be almost universal, i.e. a law for
which “given A, B almost necessarily follows” (69).
In this way the picture is completed: for medicine also we can say that
the ex post causal explanation must constitute the instantiation of a universal
causal law or of a statistical law close to 100: only in this way will it be
possible to obtain the particularistic proof to which ex post probabilities of
around 99.9% are associated.
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9.
Counterfactuals and the “similar world”. – The considerations above,
concerning the ex ante probabilities, the ex post probabilities associated to
particularistic proof, the support offered to the latter by universal laws or by
statistical laws with a frequency very close to 100, concern commissive
causation, but must also be extended to omissive causation..
Let me introduce a short reflection on counterfactuals to see what I
mean.
According to the opinion received in the most refined Italian version –
i.e. the one developed by PALIERO in the critical analysis of my paper on
omission as a static condition: omissive causation is characterised by a
“double hypothetical nature” (70) – in case of omission, the judge must
establish what would have happened if the proper omitted conduct had been
performed: from this point of view, this has nothing to do with commissive
causation, within the sphere of which the judge asks himself if an event in the
real world, that has already occurred hic et nunc, as the development of a
material causal course, subsumible under pertinent covering laws, would have
occurred without the action.
To question oneself about “what would have happened” means
seeking the conditions and events of a hypothetical world. But how must this
world be built? At the discretion of the judge or on the basis of well identified
and predefined indications that are binding for him?
In order to realise the great practical importance of these questions, we
just have to think about the problem of the plurality of causes in case of
omissions. The sure exclusion of the intervention of other causes is a
requirement indicated by studies on logic, by the philosophy of science and
now by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court as a basic requisite in
ascertaining the causal relationship, both on the ground of commissive
causation and on that of omissive causation. But the procedural verification,
abstractly possible when the judicial investigation concerns the real world,
appears almost always, or very often, impossible to propose when the judge
enters a hypothetical world.
In establishing “what would have happened” in this type of world, we
come up against an alternative: we can think that, if the omitted conduct had
taken place, “everything would have gone well”, but we can also imagine
that, without the omission “everything would have gone equally badly”.
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So, in order to state the causal relevance of the omitted conduct, the
judge should prove that, without it, “everything would have gone well”; but what
could this proof be?
If we exclude the use of fantasy and imagination, the probatory
reference point can only be the real world; but the real world actually offers,
with an inexhaustible richness, the picture of possible interventions of other
causes. This is where the point is: if a certain type of event can be the result
of the realization of different causal propositions, how will the judge be able to
state that “everything would have gone well” in the absence of the omission?
How will he be able to affirm that an event of a certain type would not have
occurred, had the proper conduct been adopted?
Numerous “cases” can be found in the files of the Italian criminal
jurisprudence in which causation in criminal omissions is established, even
though the judge finds it impossible to prove that no other causes exist: thus
late diagnoses and late surgical operations are considered the cause of the
event despite the fact that sound scientific research, as we have already
affirmed (see par. 3) shows high mortality rates, due to the most disparate
complications that occur in the case of immediate diagnosis and operations or
admission to hospital.
Here it is clear that the judge did not even raise the problem of the sure
exclusion of other causes and, what counts more, he could not have raised it if
he had wanted to reach a verdict, because he would have found himself with
impossible evidence: in a hypothetical world, it is only with the imagination that
one can fill the vacuum of having “forgotten” mortality rates recorded in the real
world.
It is at this point that we need to rethink the topic of counterfactuals in
omissive causation hypotheses also.
The counterfactual world is, by definition, a hypothetical world; but there
are many hypothetical worlds, so we are forced to identify the counterfactual
world to which the judicial investigation must refer. According to the very
important work of DAVID LEWIS – a reference point for all investigations into
counterfactuals (71) - in identifying the possible world one must abandon
fantasy and construct the most adequate “similar world”.
If this, as it seems to me, is the only feasible approach, the conditions
and events that occur in the real world must be introduced into the similar
world; and this is so because in the real world, due to the widest range of
complications, it happens that immediate diagnoses, surgical operations and
hospitalisation do not succeed in preventing the harmful event. This should be
taken into account when constructing the similar world. Similarly, in this
construction, reference must be made to the impossibility of ex ante
probabilities to give us information about what would have happened if the
omitted conduct had occurred, as reference must also be made to the high
level of ex post probability (99.9%), that can be reached only by using
statistical laws with frequencies very close to 100. In other words, the singular
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causal proposition on what would have happened in the absence of omission
must be accompanied by the same very high ex post probabilities requested
for commissive causation.

10.
Manipulation and emptying of the content of the notion of logical
probability or rational credibility operated by the Italian case law. – The
concept of logical probability or rational probability has been deeply distorted
and unduly manipulated by numerous criminal judges who have used it (72).
This was a notion that made its appearance in Italian criminal law
language with my work of 1975: developing the analysis of CARNAP, I
emphasized the need to distinguish statistical probability, as a scientific
concept that depends on empirical research, from logical probability that is
particularly useful in propositions that concern the laws of science. I pointed
out then that “when we speak of statistical hypotheses, we refer to hypotheses
that express a quantitative relationship between kinds of repeatable events;
when we speak of scientific hypotheses more or less logically likely, we
want, on the other hand, to refer to universal or statistical hypotheses, that
enjoy varying degrees of confirmation, and that therefore are “rationally
credible” (73).
Logical probability or rational probability therefore coincided, in the
thought of CARNAP and myself, with the degree of confirmation of a law
(scientific hypothesis) offered by its own theoretical support and by controls
consisting in observation and experiment, controls that must be numerous and
heterogeneous (74).
In a similar meaning, I referred the expression “logical probability” to
singular causal statements: I emphasized that the singular statement “without
the conduct of the agent, the event would not have occurred” must be highly
likely or rationally credible in the sense that it must be founded on universal or
pertinent statistical laws and on proof that the “relative initial conditions”
occurred, i.e., in short, on the demonstrated instantiation, in the case
considered by the judge, of a universal causal law or of a statistical law with an
“almost 100” frequency (75).
But the judges’ opinions reflected many misunderstandings and
undergone several manipulations: the notion of logical probability or rational
credibility breaks away from its original meaning, because the reference to the
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degree of confirmation of scientific laws, composed of their empirical controls
disappears, as does the reference to the ex post probabilities associated to
particularistic proof, with reference to an universal causal law or to a statistical
law with probability very close to 100 (76 ).
Thus logical probability becomes a notion “hanging in a vacuum”, the
contents of which are filled by the personal and unquestionable opinion of the
individual judge: every proposition becomes reasonably credible or logically
probable if it appears such to the judge since it is “released from its bases”,
necessarily composed of the reference to the controls of scientific laws and by
particularistic proof, consisting in the verification that scientific law was
instantiated in the particular occasion examined by the judge.
Thus both science and the ex post probabilities that must be associated
to particularistic proof disappear from the scene: the inscrutable subjective
evaluation of the judge remains, in all its “sovereignty”, an expression of the
dictum “auctoritas, non veritas facit judicium” (authority, not truth informs the
judgement).
In my opinion, these explanations are unavoidable because the
conclusions reached on ex post probabilities of 99.9% (i.e. that they must, by
the very nature of things, be based on the instantiation of causal laws or
statistical laws with frequency close to 100) will be inevitably disattended as
long as our case law does not realize that logical probability or rational
credibility does not constitute a concept, the meaning of which can be
“invented” by the judge. On the contrary, its logical and epistemological roots
have been identified with absolute clarity. And it is this clarity that makes it
possible to state that only the singular causal proposition which, ex post, has a
“statistical” probability of no lower than 99%, deriving from the very high
frequency, very close to 100, of the pertinent statistical law, has a high level of
logical probability or rational credibility.
Obviously, this applies both to commissive and omissive causation. We
should also add that, in the sphere of omissive causation, logical probability or
rational credibility will not be able to receive an objective assessment when, in
the hypothetical world evoked by the counterfactual, proof based on scientific
laws and available evidence of that which would have happened if the proper
omitted conduct had taken place, is not possible (77).

11.
Difficulties in forming the new consensus: some opinions delivered by
the Supreme Court. – Going on now to instantiation of the judicial experience,
let us try to understand what has happened in Italian Supreme Court criminal
case law, especially in recent years (i.e. the years after 2000).
An initial group of sentences did actually follow the Full Bench in
considering the ex ante probabilities incapable of giving any information on
what would have happened in the case of “immediate intervention”, but
unfortunately ex ante probabilities are replaced with the “vacuum of the
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subjective and uncontrollable belief of the judge about what “would have
happened”.
Let us briefly examine the main 2002-2003 sentences which illustrate
this point of view.
1) First case (Orlando case) (78).
A doctor fails, negligently, to diagnose a tumour of the intestines in a
patient admitted to hospital; due to the failure to make the diagnosis, the
patient does not undergo an immediate surgical operation that is carried out
during a second period in hospital, just over three months later after the first
visit. The metastases, that were not ascertained with certainty at the time of
the first visit, spread rapidly in the months immediately preceding the excision
operation and despite this the patient survived for more than nine months.
The conviction of the doctor, issued by the district Court and confirmed
by the Court of Appeal, was also confirmed by the Supreme Court, Penal Sect.
IV, with a verdict that has some peculiarities. The Court clearly dismisses the
criterion of ex ante probability, quantified by the trial judges at 50% probability
of survival at 3 or 5 years in the case of immediate intervention: for the
Supreme Court, the ex ante probability amounts here to “an increase in risk”
and shows “the impossibility, due to the improper omissive causation, of
identifying with certainty the omitted conditioning factor which, if carried out,
would have prevented the occurrence of the event”. The Court observed
conclusively that there is no judge who would sentence a person by stating
that the same “had probably committed the crime”.
At this point, one would have expected the reversal of the sentence; but
the judicial resources of judges who wanted a conviction at all costs are
infinite, and thus the Supreme Court confirmed the previous sentence by
manipulating and misunderstanding the concept of logical probability I talked
about. This was in fact the conclusion of the Court: “if the disease had been
diagnosed and treated immediately, even in the least favourable hypothesis, it
would have allowed the patient to survive during a period of time quantifiable in
years”.
It makes me feel like saying: with its language, the Court creates an
non-existing reality! One does not have to be an expert in the philosophy of
language and does not even have to consult studies in logic to realize that
here we are faced by a radical absence of rational credibility considered by the
judges as legality. If the probability of a frequentist type of survival of as much
as 3 or 5 years, in the case of immediate intervention, was – as the Court
admitted – 50%, how can it be logically affirmed that the patient would
definitely have survived longer if the doctor had made the omitted diagnosis at
the first visit?
It is a real shame that the Court followed this path. It is true that a
fundamental role in the causal investigation must be assigned – as the Court
recognizes - to the ex post investigation based on the evidence available
concerning the individual case, but it is equally true that only the ex post
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investigation should tell us, on the basis of the acquisitions of medical science,
what are the reasons for affirming that the case of the patient who underwent
excision operations does not fall within 50% of the cases of patients to whom
an immediate operation did not guarantee a survival of as much as 3 or 5
years.
The roots of this distortion of the concept of logical probability must
however be sought in the premises from which the Judge moves: “frequently
universal scientific laws or simply statistical laws suitable for solving the case
brought to the examination of the judge do not exist and sometimes – as
subsequent research confirms – are false – therefore the judge is obliged to
resort to simple rules of empirical rationality, as long as they are plausible” (79).
Simple rules of empirical rationality with undefined content and
detached from the laws of science would therefore represent an “expedient”
used by the Supreme Court to confirm the conviction.
It is in this way that the process of forming the consensus on the new
way of understanding omissive causation was unexpectedly blocked.
2) Second case (Albissini case) (80).
With a sentence following the teachings of the Full Bench of 10.7.2002,
the IV pen. sect. of the Supreme Court confirmed the jail sentence of a doctor
who had omitted to describe, in the radiological report on the thorax, the
presence of an oval opacity of medium intensity, measuring approximately 11.5 cm, which later turned out to be a neoplastic pulmonary formation (after
about one and a half years the measurements were approximately 4 cm.). By
not suggesting further and more detailed investigations, even of a tomographic
and stratigraphic type, the doctor was supposed to have prevented early
diagnosis of the disease and the implementation of immediate surgical
operations, thus causing the death of the patient three years later, following
the formation of brain and liver metastases.
The Court so held: the diagnosis of the pulmonary pathology, if and as
made at the time the x-ray was executed, “would quite probably have allowed
- resorting to immediate surgical and therapeutic remedies, such as pulmonary
resection - a survival of 5 years, greater therefore compared with that of 3
years which actually happened”. The expression “quite probably” – continues
the Court – also fully satisfies the demand of the result of the counterfactual: it
is in fact “ a rule of experience, as well as a scientific rule, that the efficacy of a
tumoral diagnosis, for the purposes of longer survival, can be linked directly to
its immediacy and precocity”. Longer survival would have been statistically
indicated by the board of experts “in 48% of cases with reference to a period of
time of as much as 5 years”.
We are dealing again with ex ante probabilities: this is in short the
criterion that supports the counterfactual, indicating how things would have
gone in the event of immediate intervention. And yet, the same Court had
expressed its agreement with the teaching of the Full Bench, according to
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which “it is not allowed to deduce automatically from the probability expressed
by the statistical law confirmation or refutation of the prosecutor hypothesis on
the existence of the causal relashionship”.
In fact the ex post investigation was carried out and it did show up
metastases, first in the brain and then in the liver, that led to the patient’s
death; but the problem was to identify the ex post probabilities relating to
survival for more than three years, in the hypothesis in which surgical
intervention had been immediate, with reference to mortality rates in
immediate operations and to the demonstrated irrelevance of the size of the
nodule of 1-1.5 cm. compared with the nodule of 3 cm and more (81). The
opinion has nothing to say about these probabilities and cannot do better than
refer to the 48% of ex ante probability.
When all is said and done, the Supreme Court does not move very far
from the less recent orientation for which “even only small probabilities of
success” (sect. IV. no. 4320/83), “serious and appreciable probabilities of
success” also represented by 30% (sect. IV, no. 371/92), “the high level of
possibility” consisting in 75% probability of survival (sect. IV, no. 1126/2000)
are sufficient.
Here the marks left by the Orlando sentence are clearly visible: it does
not matter that the ex ante probabilities of survival at 5 years (therefore higher
than the actual survival of 3 years) was 48%: the arguments of the District
Court appear “completely reasonable, rigorously anchored to the trial findings”,
logically explained by “the proclaimed deterioration of the neoplastic pathology
towards processes of gradual metastatisation and therefore towards the fall in
the vital balances of the organism”.
As we can see, this opinion too does not give us any information on the
reasons why the patient should not fall within the 52% of cases that would not
have survived as long as 5 years in any case even in the case of an immediate
operation. In those 52% of cases, metastases constitute a normal evolution of
the tumoral disease.
3) Third case (Amato case) (82)
Again, in the period following the Franzese sentence, the IV penal
section of the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of the assistant
surgeon who was accused of failing to issue an immediate diagnosis of a
testicular pathology (twisting of the testicle) from which a patient was suffering,
wrongly diagnosing colic in the right kidney, without prescribing any
appropriate instrumental tests and without submitting the patient to an
immediate surgical operation.
The district Court sentence referred to by the Supreme Court, stated
that, at the time of the visit “there was still an approximately 40% possibility
that the surgical operation would have been successful”. But, in the opinion of
the Supreme Court, this circumstance was irrelevant, given that “the harmful
event took place -. with a causal link that was considered unavoidable and was
81
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ascertained with certainty – due to the wrong diagnosis, failure to ascertain the
pathology and the lack of the order to proceed with further, necessary tests”.
Once again, the Court forgets that logic and science are not optionals: if
ex ante probabilities are 40%, how can it be affirmed that the causal
relationship was proven with certainty?
Of all the sentences considered, this is surely the most peculiar due to
the obvious incompatibility showed by two propositions with an antithetical
meaning: if there were 60 ex ante probabilities that an immediate surgical
operation would not have been successful, the least we could expect from a
conviction was an explanation of why, on the basis of the evidence available
ex post, the considered case should fall within the 40% of success of the
immediate operation.
Once again, we can see the far-reaching effect of the Orlando verdict:
recourse to ex ante probabilities and to science is wrong and must be replaced
with no better identified criteria of empirical rationality or with no better defined
generalizations of common sense.
4) Fourth case (Guida Case) (83).
This is, perhaps, the most clamorous breach of the law by the Supreme
Court.
A patient suffering from a psychotic depressive syndrome was admitted
to a clinic and committed suicide by jumping out of a window in a place
outside the clinic, after obtaining the permission of her doctor to leave the clinic
with a person to accompany her. The latter was not informed about the mental
state of the patient nor about her previous attempts to commit suicide by
jumping out of a window.
The Supreme Court confirms the conviction. This sentence is a
paradigmatic case of an only apparent motivation: not only did it state the
commissive causation relationship linked to the permission to leave the clinic
in a circumstance of “increased risk” but, from the point of view of omissive
causation, it did not utter a word about a fundamental circumstance, pointed
out by the defence on appeal: according to the Prosecutor’s psychiatric expert,
there was “the same probability that the woman would have committed
suicide inside the clinic” perhaps “by hanging herself from the toilet shutter
box....The depressed patient is one of the most difficult patients to treat,
because suicide is possible even when they are within the hospital system,
despite all the precautions that are taken. For example, it has even happened
that a brother, who was the only relative, was asked to stay in hospital with a
patient during the most intense period of her depression, to help look after this
person. Then, when the drugs started working, this person was less
depressed and was given a minimum amount of freedom. On the day she
committed suicide. Her brother had been with her from 2 o’clock in the
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afternoon until 7 o’clock in the evening. At 7 o’clock it was dinner time and all
the relatives left: the woman said ‘I am going to the toilet for a minute’, at 7.15
she had not come out, at 7.20 they went into the toilet and found her hanging
from the toilet shutter box. This situation was unforeseeable, not expected and
completely without warning.... So, sometimes the depressed patient may carry
out self-harming gestures in a completely unpredictable way and without
there being any possibility for the staff to intervene”.
The opinion of the Prosecution expert was fully confirmed by psychiatric
science: “according to psychiatry, patients who really intend killing themselves
will succeed in doing so. No amount of physical containment, careful
observation and clinical ability can stop a patient who is really determined to
kill itself. One of these patients was placed in an isolation room with nothing
but a mattress. All his clothes and his possessions were removed and he was
checked regularly every fifteen minutes. In the space between controls and
every quarter of an hour, the patient started jumping on the mattress with such
force that he managed to bang his head against the ceiling, until he broke his
neck” (84).
Auctoritas, non veritas, non lex facit judicium: (authority, not truth, not
law informs the judgement) as ancient Roman law put it: this is the most kind
comment one can make at the opinion of the Supreme Court. An authority that
sees in the search for the truth not the duty of the criminal trial, but an
academic whim; and an authority that puts itself above the law and the same
Constitution: even the constitutional principle on the right to defend oneself can
be considered an academic whim!
Obviously, these “axioms” must in some way be hidden, but how can
they be hidden? Nothing is easier: with reference to the empty formula of
logical probability or rational credibility, understood as probability and
credibility considered by the judge according to his inscrutable opinion. The
ghost of the Orlando is still hanging around; and in fact, for the Supreme Court,
in the Guida case, “the judgement of responsibility can and must be given
when ..... the finding that the incriminating conduct was a necessary condition
of the harmful event with a high degree of rational probability or logical
credibility is justified and procedurally certain”.
A further remark has to be made: according to the jurisprudence Review
of the Supreme Court, issued by the Office of the Digest of Case Law of the
Supreme Court of Cassazione, the Guida opinion represents “a particular case
of deviation from the dictum of the Full Bench”, characterised only by “a formal
deference to the teaching of the quoted Franzese pronouncement” (85). We
have here therefore the most authoritative confirmation of the existence of a
trend which, in open rebellion against the Full Bench, acknowleges the
“emptiness” of the subjective and uncontrollable opinion of the judge in
establishing, in cases of omissive causation, “what would have happened”.
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12. The new consensus and the opinions of the Supreme Court anchored to
statistical laws with frequencies close to 100 and to particularistic proof
associated to ex post probability of 99.9%. –This trend is however opposed by
another: the Supreme Court opinions, held by penal section IV, consider the
finding unjustified when, on the basis of the laws of medical science, the judge
cannot affirm that, if the omitted conduct had taken place, a statistical law with
a frequency close to 100 would not have been instantiated.
Let us look briefly at these sentences.
1) First case (Baltrocchi case) (86).
Baltrocchi was a doctor on duty at the emergency department of a
hospital. A patient had felt ill and the doctor had diagnosed chronic bronchitis
and a hypertensive crisis in a patient who was known to have been
hospitalised on previous occasions, to have suffered a myocardial infarction
and to be undergoing pharmacological therapy. Following the diagnosis, the
doctor considered that is was not necessary to admit the patient and sent him
home, prescribing aerosol therapy and a visit to a specialist to be made the
following day. After returning home, the patient died the same night. The
doctor at the emergency department was prosecuted for not having
hospitalised and therefore for not having kept the patient under observation,
even though the haemogas test had shown hypoxia, hypercapnia and
metabolic alkalosis, so that after being sent home the patient was left without
any therapy to prevent and cope with the cardio-respiratory crisis from which
he died. The district Court acquitted the doctor, holding that there were no
elements that allowed the judges to state, with a sufficient degree of certainty,
the causal relationship between the death and the alleged omissive conduct.
Doubts remained about the suitability of the alternative hypothetical treatments
to prevent the death of the patient, or, in any case, to decrease the danger of
death at a relevant percentage. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand,
delivered its reversing opinion based on the remark that ex ante probabilities of
survival, in the case of immediate treatment, were lower than 50%, but were
not irrelevant, even if very limited. According to the district Court, the causal
relationship between the omissive conduct and the fatal event could be
affirmed only if the omitted conduct had serious and appreciable possibilities of
success. The Supreme Court, crim. sec. IV, reversed holding that ex ante
probabilities lower than 50% do not give any information on what really
happened and that, in the case at hand, it was impossible to exclude that the
event would have occurred even if the omitted proper conduct had been
carried out. Ex ante probabilities of 50% and 28% (on which the experts
agreed in reconstructing the two different hypotheticals) “are a long way from
being ..... ‘close to 100’, as required by science, logic and as, consequently,
required by the law. They are very far, therefore, from constituting, for the
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judge, the covering law he needs in order to state the causation relationship in
scientific and therefore penally satisfactory terms”. The counterfactual – the
Court goes on to say – aimed at identifying the necessary condition, is
impossible due to “the impossibility of knowing if the patient died due to that
lack of treatment or, on the other hand, due to the residual 50% of causes,
which, despite the treatment, could have led to his death in any case”. In other
words, if “the event can have been caused by a certain conduct”, but “may also
have not”, it must be excluded that the omissive conduct can be defined as the
necessary condition for the event. The truth is – the Court concluded – that
“‘perhaps’ lays in the reign of the ‘possible’, ‘perhaps’ is not probability close to
certainty, and does not represent a percentage of cases close to 100”, a lot
more is needed for a sentence, i.e. ex post demonstration of the instantiation
of a covering law with frequency close to 100.
2) Second case (Musto case) (87).
A women who had been receiving treatment for recurring attacks of
tachycardia since she was a child, was diagnosed by her GP as having “Wolf
Parkinson White’s syndrome”, consisting in “the presence of accessory
anatomical connections – actual bridges between the atrium and the ventricle
– composed of myocardial fibres parallel to the normal atrium ventricle
conduction system”. This syndrome, over the years, had been controlled with
pharmacological treatment, until Dr. Musto, in July 1993, had suggested to the
patient, obtaining her consent, to resolve the pathology once and for all by
ablation treatment of the so-called “anomalous section”. However, the ablation
treatment was not successful; on the contrary it resulted in a small lesion along
the coronary cavity. The patient went into a coma due to serious brain
damage caused by cerebral anoxia and died following a cardio-surgical
operation. The Court of Appeal confirmed the sentence of the Naples trial
Court, holding that “the causal relationship can be affirmed even when the
doctor’s work, if correctly and immediately carried out, led not to certainty, but
only to serious and appreciable possibilities of success, so that the patient’s
life, with a certain probability, would have been saved .... The statistic data
offered by the expert, concerning similar cases in which patients were saved,
make it possible to state that an immediate diagnosis and immediate actions to
remedy the cardiac tamponage, would have prevented the cerebral anoxia that
caused the patient’s death”. Crim. sect. IV of the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction and sent the case back to the Court of Appeal, affirming doubtlessly
wrong the statement on the sufficiency of serious and appreciable probabilities
of success and observing that reference to the expert’s statistics represents an
undemonstrated statement. Those statistics were not specified and subjected
to critical scrutiny: “in fact it is only by knowing these statistics that we can
understand if it was ascertained that, with a probability close to certainty, with
a probability close to 100, that conduct ...... was the necessary cause of the
event as it occurred hic et nunc”.
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In short, ex ante probabilities must be quantified because, if they are
not, the judge is not able to verify, ex post, if the conduct and event constitute
the instantiation of the chain of typical conducts–events indicated by a
covering law with frequency close to 100.
3) Third case (Di Cintio case) (88).
The doctor on duty at the emergency department of a hospital, called
out to the home of a patient, did not ask for the patient to be admitted to
hospital, even though at the time of the visit “the latter had a neurological
situation characterised by loss of consciousness and loss of urine”. When the
patient was hospitalised the following day, a myocardial infarction was
diagnosed. The delay in hospitalisation made therapy unfeasible and the
patient died “due to acute myocardial infarction complicated by bilateral
pneumonia, ischemic lesions in the area of the right cerebral artery, atrial
fibrillation, congestive cardiac decompensation with pulmonary oedema and
acute respiratory failure with bradyarhythmia and with terminal cardiogenic
shock”. The Court of Appeal convicted the doctor for failure to ask for
hospitalisation of the patient in a medical situation “clearly indicated by loss of
consciousness, even if temporary, and by loss of urine”, observing that if the
patient had been hospitalised immediately, he would almost certainly have
been saved. Crim. sect. IV of the Supreme Court confirmed, observing that
“from the juridical point of view, the causal relationship is affirmed not in terms
of a scientifically unachievable certainty, but in terms of almost certainty, not in
terms of a percentage equal to 100, but in terms of coefficient percentages
close to 100, a little less than 100”. To say that the patient would almost
certainly have been saved means making a statement equivalent to that of a
probability close to 100%.
Perhaps we should criticize the trial judgement reached by the Court of
Appeal on this matter. In fact it is difficult to give credit to the idea that the
patient could almost certainly have been saved if he had been hospitalised
immediately. In the debate, the expert affirmed that at the time it occurred “the
infarction was already at the second or third stage”, i.e. it was a very extensive
infarction and that the complications that arose during hospitalisation, directly
proportional to the infarction area, “once they had occurred, were difficult to
control”. As we have seen, however (prev. par. 3) a high percentage of
patients hospitalised immediately for myocardial infarction die as a result of
acute cardiogenic shock. Therefore, to support the conviction there should
have been proof (impossible) that the patient certainly or almost certainly
would not have died from shock.
13. The possibility of overcoming the split existing within the Supreme Court. –
In conclusion, we must notice that two opposing trends exist within the
jurisprudential sphere of crim. sect. IV of the Supreme Court. For the first one
the concept of ex ante probabilities must be abandoned and replaced by an
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indefinite criterion of a logical probability which corresponds to the inscrutable
opinion of the judge; for the second, the specific causal statement must have
a very high ex post probability (as we have seen, 0.999) of being instantiated,
a probability that can only be reached if it is supported by a statistical law with
a frequency close to 100.
This “split” within the jurisprudence of the IV crim. sect. is still
preventing the raising of a new consensus; nevertheless it is not unreasonable
to forecast that the split will soon be eliminated, since those who reject the
idea of the instantiation of a statistical law with a frequency close to 100 have
no arguments to support their point of view. There are, on the contrary, many
convincing arguments to support the other trend.
This means that criminal trials for omission, on the part of the doctor, of
the proper necessary conduct, are destined to decrease drastically because
very often it is impossible to prove that, if the omitted proper conduct had been
carried out, the harmful event would not have occurred with an ex post
probability of 99.9 following the application of a statistical law with frequency
close to 100.
However, in our country too, the idea that we must take the path of civil
liability has to replace the old penal practice, especially because the penalty
of compensation of damage is certainly better equipped with higher profiles of
deterrence than the criminal penalty. (Think to the “punitive damages” of
American civil jurisprudence).
Once this path has been taken, it will be possible to create a civil
jurisprudence based on the concept of the “lost chances”: the causal
relationship, that in many cases can not be demonstrated in the criminal trial,
will on the other hand be easy to verify by identifying the damage not in the
harmful event itself, but in the decrease of “possibilities of survival or recovery”
linked to the omitted proper conduct (89).

14. Particolaristic proof on what really happened and the elimination of the
problem of omissive causation. – On the other hand, sometimes consideration
of what really happened can allow us to understand that the problem of
omissive causation has been misplaced.
I can remember, here, amongst others, two recent cases (90). The first
concerns the charge against a team of doctors for having made a late
diagnosis of intestinal infarction: the ex ante probabilities of a successful
operation were around 10-30%, but the particularistic proof offered by the
operating journal and by the description of the patient’s situation made by the
pathologist had shown not only that these ex ante probabilities were not
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instantiated but that, if it had really been late, the diagnosis would have had
the effect of prolonging the patient’s life rather than shortening it.
The second case concerns the charge against a heart surgeon for
having implanted a faulty cardiac valve in a patient; if the omitted proper
conduct had been carried out, and the quality of the valve had been controlled
before the operation, death some months later due to breakage of the valve,
would not have occurred. Here again the ex ante probability of a successful
operation with a faultless valve appears high; but here too the particularistic
proof shows, through a careful and accurate check made by the judge’s
experts, that those ex ante probabilities were not instantiated because
breakage of the valve turned out to be due to the violent cardiac massage
carried out in the hospital’s emergency department where the patient had been
admitted after feeling ill.
In both cases, the ex post probabilities associated to the particularistic
proof were clearly higher than a threshold “very close to 1”.
Perhaps we should illustrate in detail the reasons for acquittal at both
trials.
First case: a patient is admitted to hospital and is defined “at dramatic
risk” having had four strokes, one heart attack, a bypass operation, an
aneurysm of the abdominal aorta, serious kidney failure, a peripheral
arteropathy of the limbs, a stenosis of the succlavian artery and hypertension.
A whole medical team was prosecuted because – according to the Prosecution
– a late diagnosis had been made of an intestinal infarction in the patient while
he was in hospital: the delay in diagnosis was supposed to have caused a
delay in surgery that did not manage to save the patient’s life.
The Prosecutor focused on the delayed diagnosis: the symptoms shown
by the patient, (first constipation, then diarrhoea, fever, leucocytosis and pain
at palpation) were supposedly wrongly interpreted by the medical team which,
for several days, did not suspect intestinal infarction, thus making impossible
an immediate operation that would have given the patient a probability of
between 10 to 30% of survival.
The patient died following surgery. Result of the post-mortem: death
due to multi-organic failure caused by the thrombotic occlusion of the
mesentery, complicated by gangrenous intestinal necrosis, toxic-infectious
state, shock and pneumonia. All of this – according to the Prosecution – would
not have happened if the operation had been carried out immediately.
What happened? The Prosecution expert had failed to analyse the post
mortem results and above all had completely neglected to examine the
operating diary. In the debate, the pathologist had clearly explained, also by
means of photographs, that occlusion of the lumen of the mesenteric artery by
a fibrinoleucocytarious thrombus was recent and dated back to only just a few
hours before the patient’s death, and had also indicated the serious drop in
pressure which the patient suffered, at a certain moment during the operation.
But the operating diary revealed astonishing details: it appeared from
this diary that the large intestinal infarction, ascertained during the postmortem, had developed after the operation, following the so-called “low range
syndrome”, while what the surgeon had operated on was a very small
infarction.
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In conclusion: the cause of the patient’s death was not the thrombotic
occlusion of the vessel, dating back to some hours before, but a break-down in
the haemodynamic balances, the result of surgery on a high risk individual.
According to the pathologist, the cause of the death was to be found in the
generalized arteriopathy that was so extensive and serious that, if the
operation had been carried out earlier, it would have accelerated the death of
the patient, instead of giving him more chances of survival.
The monocratic Court of Milan considered this situation decisive,
irrespective of the consideration that the operation for intestinal infarction is a
high mortality event (from 70 to 90%) even in individuals without the
pathologies found in the patient.
As we can see, this case proves exactly what we were saying about ex
post investigations on the basis of available evidence, very strongly quoted by
the Full Bench.
From the medium-low frequency of cases of survival, in the case of an
immediate operation on a patient with intestinal infarction, of around 10-30%
we do not get any information about what would really have happened. In the
case presented by the Prosecution, if the operation had been carried out some
time before, the patient would have died earlier.
The truth is that in a trial for medical negligence the Prosecutor finds
himself in the same situation as the doctor: he must proceed with the inductive
method and collect very extensive data; he must put all available evidence
“into a state of siege” in order to arrive at a formulation of the hypothesis. What
the Prosecutor in the case at hand did not do, was to prompt his experts to
observe “all the facts”, to formulate the hypothesis and to submit it to attempts
of falsification, on the basis of further factual checks (91).
Second case: an innovative heart valve in pyrolytic carbon was inserted
in a man of 44 years of age, suffering from aortic stenosis and with a
congenital coronary anomaly, in a skilfully-performed and perfectly successful
operation. After some months, the man was taken to the emergency
department in cardio-circulatory and respiratory arrest. A prolonged heart
massage was carried out in vain but all the doctors could do was to ascertain
his death. The Prosecution charged the heart surgeon with manslaughter for
having failed to ascertain the composition, resistance and quality of the heart
valve: during the post-mortem, faults had been found in the valve that
explained why it had broken.
During the debate it appeared that the valve had become distorted, but
after the heart massage had been carried out. In fact, if the fracture had
occurred previously – according to the Prosecutor’s expert - heart failure would
have been hyper-acute and the death would have occurred within just a few
minutes.
Here again, what happened? The Prosecution expert had shown that
he did not have full knowledge of the applicable rules and basic technical
notions; the examination he carried out had been extremely superficial, the
hypothesis he had made following which the death of the patient was due to
breakage of the valve had been equally superficial and rash. The experts
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nominated by the judge, on the other hand, had concluded their report by
affirming that the elements collected were “strongly suggestive” of a “mode of
death consisting in a ventricular arhythmia supported by an ischemic
substratum”: i.e. by a condition that had resulted in hospitalisation in the
emergency department.
And it was actually at the emergency department – as emerged during
the debate – that the patient was subjected to a violent and prolonged
massage that explains the breakage of the prosthesis. On that occasion, the
prosthesis was subjected to strong stress that caused it to break, as a series of
lesions of the thorax and subcutaneous bruises established.
These were the conclusions of the Court: “all the experts agree in
stating that breakage of the valve would have led to the death of the patient
within a few minutes and not, as in this case, after an appreciable period of
time and not after being admitted to the emergency department;..... therefore,
we can safely state that death was not caused by breakage of the valve
before the patient was admitted to the emergency department”.
As we can see, this is a similar situation to the previous one: the facts,
the available evidence were placed “in a state of siege” during the debate,
through the examination and cross-examination of experts of the two parties.
The Prosecutor relied on the evidence gathered by his pathologist with a
technique that one expert of the defence defined as typical of “the Third
World”.
This is how disputes on omissive causation often arise: with techniques
typical of the Third World.
The moral to be drawn is that very often the omitted proper conduct
seems to be on the part of the Prosecution and its experts. And it is here that
the reference of the Full Bench to the duty, on the part of the judge, to carry
out a rigorous ex post verification of all available evidence assumes a very
sound significance. Only with this inductive verification the problem of omissive
causation is solved at the root. In the latter case, it is ex post evidence that
shows that we are not faced by an omitted proper conduct (failure to check the
quality of the characteristics of the heart valve) but in presence of a hypotesis
of active causation that cannot be attributed to the defendant.
Once again the warning of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the Daubert case proves to be true: judges must exercize much greater control
over experts than over witnesses, because experts can draw conclusions that
are so misleading that they could result in the conviction of innocent individuals
(92).
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